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CIVIL SUITS AND BUSINESS: ARE BIG
VERDICTS REALLY A DETERRENT?
Floyd Norris *
October 1, 2004
Thank you Henry. It is a pleasure to be here today, although I
must admit to having some doubts about why I was invited. Unlike
most of the members of this panel, I am not a law school graduate,
and in my work at The New York Times I write columns and news
stories on business, finance and economics. I am not an expert on the
civil justice system.
But I was invited, so I want to give a few thoughts, some of
them stimulated by the writings of my very distinguished colleagues
on this panel and some by having watched class action securities
suits over the years.
It seems to me that the civil justice system often sets out to solve
problems when it perceives that no one else is doing so. That is the
nature of the common law. Sometimes it works better than others.
But when critics of the civil justice system assert it is doing a bad
job-as many tort reformers are doing now-their reaction is too
often only to try to limit the ability of the court system to do that bad
job. Thus we see efforts to force cases out of state courts into federal
ones, or to cap damage claims, or to reduce contingency fees in the
hope that will keep bad lawsuits out of court.
It seems to me that the correct answer is often to be found by
looking outside the civil justice system to seek a better remedy than
the one the courts are providing for the real problem that the courts
are trying to attack.
With that perspective, let me turn briefly to the alleged crisis in
malpractice insurance. Premiums have soared and those costs are
* Chief Financial Correspondent, The New York Times.
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being passed on, to some extent at least, in the form of higher
medical fees and therefore higher medical insurance costs. I presume
that excellent doctors, as well as lousy ones, are paying those high
premiums.
The response from some defenders of the current system-that
the insurance companies are often guilty of bad business practices-
is correct, but it misses the real point.
Certainly there are cycles in the insurance industry in which
companies write policies that turn out to be uneconomic, and then
overcompensate by jacking up rates as some companies withdraw
from the market. Part of Warren Buffett's success has come from a
willingness to write policies when others are scared, and to walk
away from writing policies when excessive optimism has pushed
premiums down to unreasonably low levels.
And certainly any long-tail insurance-that is insurance where
claims will be paid long after premiums are collected-is going to be
priced in part on expected investment returns for the companies that
collect those premiums. So when interest rates are high, or equity
markets soaring, we can expect companies to charge premiums based
on investment assumptions that may turn out to be too optimistic.
Those issues have nothing to do with the quality of medical care in
the country.
My perspective is that we should ask instead what else could be
done to improve the quality of care. If malpractice litigation were
having its intended deterrent effect, perhaps we would see fewer and
fewer cases filed. We are not seeing that.
What I think is needed is a better, and faster, system of
regulation of physicians. My view is colored, let me admit, by the
first doctor I ever admired. When I was growing up here in Los
Angeles, I had a distant cousin who was a physician, and, my father
told me, a very distinguished one. He did not ever treat me. But his
role in our family was to vet other doctors. He told me that the
medical establishment knew which doctors were any good, and
which were not. If a member of my family needed a specialist, we
depended on Dr. Norris to check out reputations.
I wondered then, as a teenager, why the doctors who were not so
good-or were even bad-were allowed to continue practicing. And
I still do. My conclusion is that state medical boards are reluctant to
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lift credentials in all but the most egregious cases. So bad doctors go
on practicing, and get hit with enough suits to drive up costs for
everyone.
I do not know the extent to which malpractice insurance
companies weigh litigation histories in deciding whether to insure a
particular doctor, or in deciding what premium to charge. If they do
not, that suggests a perception-encouraged by the health care
industry-that malpractice verdicts are an almost random event, no
more foreseeable than lightning strikes. I hope that is not the case.
Before I finish discussing medical malpractice, I would like to
say a good word for a suggestion of Philip Howard, which is for
specialized courts in medical cases. I don't know whether that would
reduce malpractice verdicts and settlements, as I think he hopes, but I
think it might make them more predictable and more accepted by the
medical establishment. And that might, in turn, lead to a better
regulation of the industry, whether by state medical boards or by the
insurance companies that are paying the bills.
An essential fact of the tort justice system is that it is supposed
to have a deterrent effect and thereby diminish the bad activity
alleged in the lawsuits. That will not be the case if those who are
supposed to be deterred-or those with power over them-believe
that verdicts are random and not indicative of anything but a justice
system out of control.
If doctors believe that suits and verdicts stem not from
malpractice but from bad outcomes of medical care, some of which
are of course inevitable, then we are not likely to see real steps taken
to reduce malpractice. A similar problem may exist in another area,
that of suits alleging police brutality. In New York, where I lived for
many years before moving to Paris this year, I have been told that the
city does not pay attention to such suits, even after it pays out big
verdicts or settlements, when it comes to taking disciplinary action
against police officers.
To return to Mr. Howard's idea of expert courts, it seems to me
that in corporate law such an expert system already exists. It is the
Delaware Chancery courts. The vast majority of companies are
incorporated in Delaware, and while companies sometimes threaten
to leave Delaware when the judges there restrict the authority of
management, they do not carry out their threats. What Delaware
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offers is a group of judges who hear only corporate law cases, and
who get to be experts. That helps to make the law predictable. And
that is important if the legal system is to have a deterrent effect.
In some other states, such cases may go before any trial judge,
who may or may not know much about that area of law, and that
does not make it easy to, forecast what will or will not be ruled
illegal.
In the tort reform debate, we hear thinly veiled suggestions of
corruption, largely based on the idea that trial lawyers help judges to
get elected who will then rule for the trial lawyers.
That problem may be a real one, but as a student of financial
history, I would like to remind you of real judicial corruption, as was
shown in the Nineteenth century in perhaps the greatest battle for
corporate control ever waged-between Jay Gould and Commodore
Vanderbilt for control of the Erie Railroad.
It started with Vanderbilt trying to buy control of the Erie by
purchasing shares in the open market. Gould and his allies, who
controlled the line, responded by printing new shares and selling
them to Vanderbilt, while printing even more for themselves. The
fight quickly went to court, where both Gould and Vanderbilt had
judges on retainer, who issued competing injunctions against the
other side.
With the courts neutered and discredited, the battle went to the
New York legislature, some of whose members were happy to take
bribes from both sides. In the end, having concluded that both the
judicial and legislative branches were too expensive, Vanderbilt and
Gould reached a settlement, which the legislature ratified. Those
who are distressed at the state of civil litigation today may want to
recall that it used to be a lot worse.
The title of this panel raises the question whether the tort system
is a "destroyer of business." To me, that brings up a subject I have
covered, which is securities class action litigation. It is an area
where business has sought changes, with some success. In 1995,
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act over
the veto of President Clinton.' It seems to me-based on
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. & 18 U.S.C).
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impressions rather than any detailed study-that the legislation has
done some good, but not in the way its sponsors expected.
The perception among many companies was-and is-that they
will be hit by class action securities litigation if their share price
falls, regardless of whether they did anything wrong. They believe
that many lawyers who file such suits are leeches who want to force
settlements without regard to whether they really have a case.
The Act was intended to make several changes. It was supposed
to make it easier to get cases removed to federal courts, which were
presumed to be less likely to render outrageous verdicts. It was
supposed to make it much easier to get cases dismissed early in the
process, before discovery, to prevent lawyers from going on fishing
expeditions that might, in themselves, force blameless companies to
offer settlements. And it tried to discourage the rush to the
courthouse door by saying that judges should name the lead lawyer
in class action suits based on the amount of damages allegedly
suffered by that lawyers' clients-not by who filed the first suit.
There was a perception that some class action lawyers had a stable of
plaintiffs who owned a few shares of every company around, so that
the lawyer could file within hours or even minutes of the bad news
hitting the Dow Jones ticker.
How has that reform worked? It appears to me that it has not
done a lot to discourage state claims. But I think it has tended to
concentrate the field of class action lawyers-in ways that businesses
are not necessarily happy about.
I used to suspect that some securities class action suits were
filed by lawyers who were more than happy to settle them quickly on
terms that did little for their ostensible clients but a lot for the
lawyers' bank accounts. I wondered if in some cases the race to the
courthouse door was won by a settlement-inclined lawyer who was
tipped off by the company that a negative announcement was
coming.
Let me emphasize that I have no proof such a thing was going
on. But there were class action lawyers who had reputations for not
being very eager to try cases.
So what did the legislation accomplish? First, it probably has
deterred some frivolous lawsuits, which is a good thing. But in
general such cases did not cost business very much anyway. In the
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case of suits with merit, the legislation may have made it worse for
companies. A relatively small number of institutional investors-
largely but not solely public pension funds-are now willing to serve
as lead plaintiff. And given the size of their holdings in almost every
company, they are likely to be the biggest plaintiffs around, and
therefore able to get the lead plaintiff status if they want it.
Those institutions can afford protracted litigation if they really
are determined to do so, so it is not just a matter of how deep the
pockets of the plantiffs' lawyers are in financing a lawsuit. They
may be really angry over what some company did-and determined
to teach other companies a lesson. So I think that major lawsuits
may be less likely to settle at low verdicts now.
Let me turn now to a special class of defendants in securities
litigation, one that I have written a lot about over the years-the
auditors. For years, they have viewed themselves as victims who get
nailed only because they have the deep pockets. In a classic
corporate fraud, by the time the suits are filed the company may be
bankrupt, and thus judgment proof. The company officials who
actually organized the fraud may have little in the way of assets left,
at least relative to the damages being claimed. So the lawyers went
after the auditors, who viewed it all as horribly unfair. Sure some
audits failed to find fraud, they said, but that did not mean the
auditors did anything wrong.
Now there are senior officials of auditing firms who privately
say that without legal reforms to protect them, it is inevitable that
one of the remaining Big Four firms will be driven out of business by
a big judgment in some pending case. They want Congress to limit
their liability, perhaps to a multiple of the audit fees they received.
Such a cap would be a small fraction of the amount that can be lost
due to a major fraud, and so far the idea does not seem to have much
political traction. The firms had hopes this year that the British
government would enact such legislation, but in the end it declined to
do so.
Parenthetically, let me say that the most interesting aspect of
recent securities litigation is that other deep pockets are being
found-the banks and investment banks who arguably have helped
companies defraud investors by coming up with financial products
intended to deceive. The SEC and the Justice Department have filed
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such cases in some high profile frauds, notably Enron, and now we
see Parmalat in Italy trying to blame both banks and auditors for its
fraud. I know some auditors who are privately gleeful over the fact
the banks are now in the same boat, although it is not clear to me
how much good that will do the auditors.
To return to the question of auditor liability, I think we have
learned in the past few years that bad audits were not always a matter
of bad luck. In too many cases, the auditors cut deals with
companies to go along with things that mayor may not have seemed
justifiable when they began but now seem outrageous. As the SEC
noted when it filed civil fraud allegations against Arthur Andersen in
the Waste Management case, auditors who sign onto small
deceptions one year risk being forced to accept larger ones the next
year, because revealing the larger ones would also reveal the smaller
ones and clearly expose the auditors to liability.
2
Andersen responded to that SEC suit by settling it and then
ignoring it. The SEC found evidence from e-mail messages that
some senior officials at Andersen had known of fraud and
countenanced it. It barred those auditors from auditing public
companies, but Andersen chose not to fire them. It put one of them
to work revising Andersen's policy on document retention. His
policy called on auditors to be vigilant in destroying documents that
were no longer needed, and did not specify that such shredding
should stop if the firm learned of a possible SEC inquiry. It was that
policy David Duncan, Andersen's lead auditor for the Enron account,
claimed to be following when he shredded Enron's documents and
Andersen's reputation.
The Enron and WorldCom frauds led to the 2002 passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.3 The most important part of that
legislation was the creation of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, which would like to be known as the PCAOB but
is called Peek-a-boo by many in the industry.
2. E.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Waste Management
Founder, Five Other Former Top Officers Sued for Massive Fraud, Mar. 26,
2004, www.sec.gov/news/headlines/wastmgmt6.htm.
3. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (2002) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.,
and 29 U.S.C.).
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That nickname is apt. Until now, there was no effective
regulator of the major accounting firms. The state boards seldom
acted, and the disciplinary proceedings of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants were neither quick nor effective.
For the first time, auditors know that there is a chance that
someone else is going to come along and look at their audit, in detail.
And that someone will not be a plaintiff's lawyer, who would have to
fight a long legal battle just to get the documents and whose expert
witnesses can be countered by a parade of other expert witnesses.
Instead, it will be by a regulator that has the power to discipline the
firms. From what I hear from both auditors and some corporate
executives, Peek-a-boo is already producing better audits.
To bring this talk back to where it began, and thus to a
conclusion, that precedent is one that might be profitably studied by
those worried about high premiums for malpractice insurance.
